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ABSTRACT
Micro level studies in developing countries suggest managerial skills play a key role in the adoption
of modern technologies. The human resources literature suggests that managerial skills are difficult
to codify and learn formally, but instead tend to be learned on the job. In this paper we present a
model of the interactive process between on-the-job managerial skill acquisition and the adoption
of modern technology. The environment considered is one where all learning possibilities are
internalized in the market, and where managers are complementary inputs to non-managerial
workers. The paper illustrates why some countries may adopt modern technologies while others stay
backwards. The paper also explains why managers may not want to migrate from rich countries to
poor countries as would be needed to generate income convergence.
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As reported in Easterly (2002), in 1979 Daewoo signed a collaborative agreement with Desh
Garment Ltd in Bangladesh. Daewoo agreed to bring 130 Bangladeshi workers to South Korea
for training at a Daewoo plant in return for Desh paying commissions amounting to 8 percent
of future sales. At the time of the training there were a total of 40 workers producing garments
in Bangladesh, and Desh’s ﬁrst year of operations produced $55,050 in sales on 43,000 shirts.
By 1987 the industry’s output had grown to 2.3 million shirts. During the 1980s, of the 130
Bangladeshi workers initially trained by Daewoo, 115 of them had left Desh to set up their own
garment export ﬁrms.
By working in the collaborative agreement with Desh, these workers had learned the man-
agerial skills that were the necessary accompaniment to successfully implementing the superior
South Korean technology. These workers transported the skills to their own companies and used
them to implement the superior technology whose management they had learned on the job. In
the process, they too were part of the diﬀusion of the managerial know-how to their own workers,
which in turn further facilitated spread of the technology. By 1985 there were over seven hun-
dred Bangladeshi garment companies. While not knowing exactly how many start-ups were in
turn spun-oﬀ from those founded by Desh workers, one must assume that it was large — by 1995
Bangladesh was exporting $2 billion in garments (comprising 54% of exports).2
This process of on the job managerial skills acquisition may play a central role in under-
standing both development successes and processes of technological diﬀusion. For example, Lall
(1999) describes the dramatic increases in the use of managers in the fast-growing East-Asian
economies. She also describes the critical role managers played in changing traditional human
resource attitudes and policies towards the newer demands required in ‘mature’ economies. Ev-
idence drawn from many LDCs also conﬁrms that managerial skills are in short supply and
represent a serious impediment to successful implementation of better technologies. Fafchamps
and Soderbom (2004), using matched employer-employee data for ten African countries, argue
that labor management deﬁciencies play a key role in explaining the ﬁrm size wage correlation
and low productivity.
2The ﬁrst detailed case study of Desh was undertaken by Rhee and Belot (1990). Examples of technology
diﬀusion via skilled worker and managerial mobility are commonplace in modern economies. Two examples from
advanced sectors are Saxenian (1994), who documents diﬀusion in Silicon Valley’s IT clusters, and Feldman’s (2001)
study of ﬁrm formation in biotechnology and communications industries in Capitol region clusters.
1Rhee and Belot (1990), in addition to providing an early analysis of Bangladesh’s garments
industry explosion, have documented the importance of managerial and technical skill transfer in
a number of successful case studies drawn from the developing world. An interesting case is the
meteoric rise in Indonesian plywood exports through the early 80’s that started with two initial
ﬁrms — Korindo and Kodeco. The take-oﬀ point was again inter-ﬁrm joint ventures — in the case
of Korindo with a Korean lumber exporter, and for Kodeco with one from Taiwan. Part of the
knowledge transfer involved the direct relocation of managers from Korea and Taiwan, as real
wage increases there had reduced their advantages in labor intensive plywood production. The
on-the-job training diﬀusion process in turn lead to managerial transfer beyond the initial ﬁrms.
In less than a decade Indonesia moved from being an importer of plywood lumber to accounting
for almost 70% of the world’s export share — $2 Billion in 1976.
A similar process occurred in the case of Colombian ﬂower exporting. A single company,
Floramerica, undertook a study to determine the feasibility of exporting ﬂowers to the US in 1969.
Prior to that time there were no commercial ﬂower enterprises in the country. Within a year it had
150 employees, and high rates of growth continued. The $100,000 initial investment grew into a
company with $50 million in annual sales by 1986. In addition to Floramerica’s dramatic growth,
the ﬂower producing and marketing know-how diﬀused to others in the Colombian economy.
In less than two decades, ﬂowers became Colombia’s ﬁfth largest export, and in the early 90’s
Colombia was second only to the Netherlands in supplying cut-ﬂowers to the world market. At
the period of study, ﬂower production for export directly employed 70,000 people in Colombia,
Rhee and Belot (1990, p31).
The means by which the relevant skills are acquired in these examples — on the job — is
consistent with evidence from the human resources literature. The skills most important for
managing seem diﬃcult to codify and learn through formal institutions. The management litera-
ture has found that most managerial learning takes place informally in the workplace — see Enos,
Kehrhahn, and Bell (2003) for a recent study, and the survey therein. For example, McCall, Lom-
bardo, and Morrison (1988) found that 30 of 35 managerial job skills were learned informally, with
relatively little gained from formal training procedures. The development of proﬁciency in a skill
seems to depend critically on experience gained through informal learning, and from observing
actual workplace leaders at work.
In light of these examples, several questions emerge. For example, how best should one model
2a process which involves on-the-job learning as a precursor to entrepreneurial activity and new
ﬁrm start-ups? How does such a process of technological diﬀusion (where individuals having
experienced the new technology become entrepreneurs or ﬁrm managers) compare to alternate
processes of diﬀusion which do not emphasize an initial step of on-the-job learning? How can the
fragility of these examples — whereby a very small number of initially trained individuals appears
to have jump started a diﬀusion process —be explained? Is it necessarily an example of market
imperfection? To what extent may such a process of skill acquisition and technology diﬀusion be
an important component on the path to economic development?
In this paper we present a model of the interactive process between managerial skill acquisition
and the adoption of new technology. The objective of the paper is to examine whether the process
of managerial skill acquisition may be relevant for understanding certain diﬃculties, or barriers,
to economic development. We want to use the model to help isolate factors that may explain why
certain countries may adopt a new technology, while others would stay backwards. There are
two important aspects to our modelling strategy. First, we model the acquisition of (technology
speciﬁc) managerial skill as resulting from on-the-job interaction with knowledgeable managers.
In particular, as an individual works in a ﬁrm and interacts with competent managers, he can
gain the skills of a manager and potentially open his own ﬁrm. However, in contrast to much
of the literature on learning-by-doing, the skills obtained as a manager are not assumed to be a
substitute to his previous skills, but instead are modelled as a complement to such previous skills.
That is, managerial skill is not modelled as being about getting better at what one previously did,
but instead is modelled as learning how to organize non-managerial workers and thereby increase
their productivity. As we shall show, this diﬀerence in the modelling of the learning-by-doing
process has strong implications for the dynamics of managerial skill premia. Second, we assume
that all the learning activities are internalized by the market in the sense that that workers can
accept lower wages to be hired in ﬁrms where they are likely to obtain managerial skills (as in
Becker (1975)). Hence, in our set up, there will be no market imperfections. This assumption is
not chosen for its realism, but has been chosen to allow us to isolate implications of the process
of managerial skill acquisition that are independent of implications of market imperfections. As a
result of this assumption, the market will generate a hedonic type equilibrium, where jobs bundle
both wage payments and managerial learning possibilities.3
3In ongoing work, we are exploring how the results here are modiﬁed and ampliﬁe di nt h ep r e s e n c eo fm a r k e t
imperfections such as in the presence of credit constraints, or thin market eﬀects.
3Our analysis of managerial skill acquisition gives rise to two main insights. On the one hand,
we show that this process of acquisition shares many similarities with the process of technological
innovation emphasized in the endogenous growth literature, even though our environment is
characterized by the absence of any market imperfections or non-convexities, and that diﬀerent
technologies are freely available. For example, in our model, agents will purposely accumulate
managerial skill knowing full well that the returns to these skills will dissipate over time, and
possibly go to zero. The reason why the price of managerial skill drops as the new technology
is adopted is because knowledgeable managers are becoming more abundant. Moreover, the
managerial wage premia may go to zero due to the fact that the learning process may continue
even if skills are abundant. Hence, in such a case, the incentive to invest in managerial skill will
be entirely driven by expected temporary rewards, which is akin to the incentive to innovate in
aR & Dm o d e lw i t hﬁnite lived patents. As we discuss below, this has important implications for
growth accounting exercises.
The second interesting ﬁnding of the analysis is that the incentive for managers to migrate from
a more developed country (where managerial knowledge is more abundant) to a less developed
country (where it is less abundant) is shown to be very weak and possibly non-existent. This
observation has the potential to help understand the persistence of under-development since,
contrary to most neo-classical models, it does not predict that the scarce factor will want to
migrate from richer to poorer countries. The reason being that the wages of managers can be
higher in the country where managers are more abundant, due to their teaching value, even
though technological opportunities satisfy constant returns to scale.
At a ﬁrst pass, it may appear that the literature on the sources of cross-country income
diﬀerences (for example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997) rules out the type of managerial
knowledge studied here as an important element in development. In particular, this literature
ﬁnds that diﬀerences across countries in the amount of human capital obtained on-the-job are
a very minor element in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in income. In this literature, the
value of skills obtained on the job are proxied by the returns to experience, and these to do
not seem to vary suﬃciently across countries to be able to explain a large part of cross country
variation in income. Since managerial skills should be a subset of on-the-job (experience driven)
human capital, this a fortiori appears to rule out managerial skills (and the institutions that favor
managerial skill) as an important element driving cross-country diﬀerences in income. However,
4as we shall show, this reasoning is ﬂawed in the case of managerial skills. In particular, we
will show why an arbitrarily large diﬀerence in income could be due to diﬀerences in available
managerial skill across countries with the same access to technology, while standard methods used
for accounting for cross-country income diﬀerences would attribute all the diﬀerence to measured
total factor productivity; thereby suggesting that the diﬀerences are due to diﬀerent availability
of technologies. 4
This paper relates to both the literature on learning-by-doing and the literature on technology
diﬀusion. In particular, it relates to the learning by doing literature since managerial skills
are assumed to be acquired on the job.5 However, as mentioned above, the key diﬀerences
between our paper and most of the learning-by-doing literature are that we do not model learning
as inducing higher productivity in the same task, but instead model the learning process as
allowing one to obtain skills that are used to organize non-managerial workers eﬃciently in a
new technology. Moreover, we emphasize the role of interaction with competent managers as
central to the learning process, which may therefore be more appropriately called learning-while-
doing instead of learning-by-doing. In relation to the literature on technological diﬀusion, the
paper closest in spirit is that of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). Their study analyzed rates of
technology diﬀusion in a model with continuous technology upgrading and vintage speciﬁcity of
skills in production. In a 2-period lived overlapping generations economy where the set of possible
technologies expands each period, they demonstrate the existence of a stationary distribution of
technologies in use (with constantly increasing average productivity) and constantly increasing
wages. Their analysis focused explicitly on stationary, or limiting distributions, of the set of
technologies in use. Instead, we characterize the dynamics of the process by which an economy
transitions from the use of a technology where managerial skills are either not needed or already
abundant, to a newer technology with higher productivity, where managerial skills are vital. Our
analysis allows us to focus upon conditions which would lead a country to adopt (or not) a new
4Growth theories that emphasize non-rivalrous technology (such as Arrow (1962a), Shell (1966), Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt(1992)) need to explain why such technologies do not diﬀuse rapidly to poor
countries. There are many proposed explanation to this puzzle. For example, one such explanation is the presence
of “barriers to adoption”, such as legal, institutional, socio-cultural or political factors, see Parente and Prescott
(2002). Another class of explanations emphasizes diﬃculties in absorption of new technologies. These could be
due to diﬀerences in skill levels, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) which may interact with within ﬁrm contracting
imperfections — Aghion, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2004). This paper oﬀers an alternative explanation based on the
process of accumulation and diﬀusion of the managerial skills needed to use a new technology.
5Important contributions to the learning-by-doing literature include Arrow (1962), Lucas (1993) , Stokey (1988)
and Young (1991). A survey of the large literature on human capital and technology diﬀu s i o ni sp r o v i d e db y
Benhabib and Spiegel (2003).
5technology, and allows us to examine incentives for cross-country migration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up a model examining managerial skills acquisi-
tion in a competitive economy. The steady state and transitional dynamics of such a process are
explored, and it is shown that the on-the-job skills framework can account for arbitrarily large
diﬀerences in income per capita across countries. Section 3 examines the consequences of this
process for growth accounting. It is shown that these fully internalized on-the-job skills need not
be detectable in cross-country growth accounting exercises, and if showing up at all, are extremely
unlikely to reﬂect their true value. Thus our model is completely consistent with observed re-
turns to experience varying little across countries. Section 4 explores the model’s implications
for migration. In particular, this section shows why unskilled labor that moves from poor to rich
countries may reap high returns, whereas similar incentives may not exist for the movement of
skilled labor to poor countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Households
Let us consider an economy where the population (or labor force) is of constant size and
normalized to 1. At each instant a new cohort of size δ enters and a measure δ of workers dies;
with the property that
R t
−∞ δe−δ(t−s)ds =1 . Each individual is risk neutral and inelastically
supplies one unit of labor per instant. Let ρ>0 be the instantaneous discount rate. All newly
entering workers do not have managerial skills, and are thus unskilled. Discounted expected





where c(t) denotes consumption.
Production
Production comprises two types of constant returns to scale activity; denoted traditional
and modern. In the modern production process there are two types of positions: management
positions and unskilled worker position. The measure of skilled managers is denoted S,w h i l e
the measure of inskilled workers is denoted U. In the traditional technology, there is only one
type of position which we call laborers and denote by L. In order to be a manager, an individual
must possess managerial skill. In contrast, anyone can be hired as an unskilled worker in the
6modern technology or as a laborer in the traditional technology. The process of managerial skill
acquisition will be discussed shortly.
Total output produced using S skilled managers, U unskilled workers, and L laborers is given
by:
Y = F (S,U)+H(L)
and since H is linearly homogeneous:
Y = F (S,U)+wL,
where w is labor’s marginal product in the traditional technology. 6 We impose the following
Inada type condition on production:
for U>0, lim
S→0
F1 (S,U)=∞ and F2 (0,U)=0
for S>0, lim
U→0
F2 (S,U)=∞ and F1 (S,0) = 0. (1)













A natural interpretation of this last condition is that production necessitates some individuals
being placed in positions requiring organizational skills, i.e., management, but when all such
positions are occupied, extra workers with such skills are more usefully allocated to positions
that could as easily be ﬁlled by the unskilled. When this occurs, the productivity diﬀerential
between a skilled manager and an unskilled worker disappears.7
Given that we want the modern technology to possibly take over from traditional technol-
ogy we assume that, if the modern technology is not managerial skill constrained, the marginal














On-the-job acquisition of managerial skills
If an unskilled individual works in the modern technology, we assume that he acquires man-
agerial skills randomly following a Poisson process, where the instantaneous rate of learning,
denoted Ω(S,U),, depends on both the number of managers and the number of workers in a
6Note that capital plays no role in the analysis and that this is without loss of generality.




α (1 − α)
1−α . In the traditional technology,
we do not make a distinction between managers and unskilled workers. This scenario can be interpreted as a
situation where the traditional technology has already reached its level of M
0
, so that the distinction between
managers and unskilled in this technology is immaterial.
7ﬁrm.8 In particular, we assume that Ω1 ≥ 0, Ω2 ≤ 0, Ω is homogeneous of degree zero and
concave. The homogeneity of degree zero implies that the speed of learning in a ﬁrm depends
only on the ratio of managers to workers. We will also employ the notation e Ω(S,U) to denote
the function Ω(S,U)U which is the instantaneous output of the skill production process. Clearly
e Ω(S,U) is homogenous of degree one and also concave.
In order to allow the process of adoption of the modern technology to begin with S =0 ,w e
assume that managerial skills can be learned by working with the new technology even without
the presence of other managers, that is, we assume that Ω(0,x) > 0 for x>0. A skilled individual
remains skilled throughout their life - i.e., individual skills do not depreciate.
2.1 The Decentralized Equilibrium
In the above setup, managerial skills acquisition is a by-product of production. However, this
does not imply that there are externalities in this process since skills acquisition is excludable.
Individuals who do not work under skilled managers in the modern technology cannot acquire
managerial skills. This teaching aspect of managers allows ﬁrms with a high ratio of managers
to oﬀer a low wage to unskilled workers knowing that the oﬀer may still be attractive since an
unskilled worker can learn managerial skills more quickly in such a ﬁr m .I ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n t ,
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms will make employment decisions taking into account that their ratio of
managers to unskilled workers aﬀects the unskilled wage it can oﬀer. Hence, an employment oﬀer
to an unskilled individual is actually a bundle that speciﬁes a wage, wu
t and a (ﬁrm speciﬁc) speed
of learning Ωt. Among bundles of wu and Ω, an unskilled worker will accordingly choose the one
that maximizes his utility. Our objective will be to characterize the situation where both ﬁrms
and workers take the market tradeoﬀ between wu and Ω as given when making their decisions,
with the equilibrium requirement that demand equals supply at each chosen pair of wu and Ω.
This type of competitive equilibrium is known as a hedonic competitive equilibrium (see Rosen
(1974)). In our case, we want to analyze a dynamic hedonic equilibrium where there is a sequence
of tradeoﬀs between wu and Ω, one at each moment in time. For further reference, it will be
useful to denote the market tradeoﬀ between wu and Ω at time t by the function G(·),w i t h
8An alternative assumption regarding managerial skills acquisition is that an unskilled individual’s learning rate
is increasing in the number of "active" managers in the ﬁrm, not the number of managers, S.This distinction arises
because it will be seen that, in some conﬁgurations, ﬁrms do not employ all potential managers in managerial
positions. However all of the paper’s results are preserved under this alternative formulation, so that we proceed
with the slightly simpler formulation stated in the text.
8wu
t = gt (Ω),g 0 (·) ≤ 0.
A competitive hedonic equilibrium will therefore need to specify a sequence of managerial
wages, ws
t and a sequence of unskilled-wage-learning tradeoﬀs wu
t = gt (Ω), such that given these
tradeoﬀs, ﬁrms choose employment to maximize proﬁts, households choose there allocation of
labor to maximize utility, and the markets for managers, unskilled workers and laborers clear.
2.1.1 The Firm’s Problem in a Hedonic Equilibrium
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize proﬁts by choosing the number of skilled workers to place in
managerial positions, the number of unskilled workers, and the wage to pay unskilled workers wu
t
taking as given the market wage of skilled workers, ws
t, and the market tradeoﬀ gt(·) between wu
and Ω.Aﬁrm hiring St skilled workers places a fraction γt ≤ 1 into managerial positions, and
the remainder (1 − γt)St into unskilled positions where they work with the unskilled workers, Ut.
This maximization is therefore given by the following, where ﬁrms recognize how their choice of
St and Ut aﬀects the speed of learning Ω(·):
max





t = g(Ω(St,U t)), and γt ≤ 1.
This yields ﬁrst order conditions:
ws
t = F1 (γtSt,(1 − γt)St + Ut) − g0 (Ω)Ω1 (St,U t)Ut (4)
wu
t = F2 (γtSt,(1 − γt)St + Ut) − g0 (Ω)Ω2 (St,U t)Ut (5)
0=[ F1 (γtSt,(1 − γt)St + Ut) − F2 (γtSt,(1 − γt)St + Ut)](1 − γt) (6)
Note that since Ω1 > 0 the wages of managers reﬂect their teaching value, whereas Ω2 < 0 reﬂects
the congestion eﬀect of the presence of too many workers.
2.1.2 The Household’s Problem in a Hedonic Equilibrium
Since consumers are risk neutral, it is easiest to analyze the household’s labor allocation problem
at the level of the cohort rather than at the level of the individual. In eﬀect, instead of ﬁrst
9determining optimal individual decisions within each cohort and then aggregating them up, the
assumption of risk neutrality allows us to ﬁrst aggregate the individual into the cohort and then
derive the optimal decisions for the cohort. This equivalence is rather well known, so we omit the
proof. The relevant cohort is still small, so they act as price takers in their allocation decisions
and the problem is best stated as one where members pool income so that each member has equal
consumption.9 The problem then amounts to allocating skilled and unskilled workers between
production in both the traditional and modern technology at each instant in order to maximize
per capita consumption. Cohort q takes as given its stock of individuals with managerial skill at
time t, denoted S(q,t). These individuals receive the market wage for skilled, ws
t. Though it is
possible for these individuals to remain in the old technology receiving w, since this is never part
of an optimal program for the skilled, to save on notation, we do not denote this possibility.
The cohort’s unskilled workers can work in the new technology (where they probabilistically
acquire managerial skills) and receive wage wu
t . This proportion is given by β (q,t). Alternatively,
unskilled workers can work in the old technology receiving w and remain unskilled for sure, with
this proportion denoted (1 − β (q,t)).
Denote the cohort’s remaining size at t as N (q,t) so that its measure of unskilled is N (q,t)−













t [(N (q,t) − S (q,t))β (q,t)]
+w[(1 − β (q,t))(N (q,t) − S (q,t))] (7)
wu
t = g(Ω) (8)
˙ S (q,t)=( N (q,t) − S (q,t))β (q,t)Ω − δS(q,t) (9)
N (q,t)=e−δ(t−q) (10)
β (q,t) ∈ [0,1] ∀t. (11)
A simple transformation of variables proves useful in analyzing this problem. Let the fraction
9Since individuals are risk-neutral, the solution for the pooled cohort is equivalent to that for each individual.


















t (1 − χ(q,t))β (q,t)
+w(1 − β (q,t))(1 − χ(q,t)). (14)






s.t. (8) (11) (13) and (14).






>λ tΩ if βt =0
= λtΩ if βt ∈ (0,1)
<λ tΩ if βt =1
(15)
g0 (Ω)=−λt (16)
˙ λt − (δ + ρ)λt = βtwu
t +( 1− βt)wo
s − ws














˙ St =( 1 − St)βtΩ − δSt. (19)
Substituting for wages from (4) and (5), the problem of characterizing the market equilibrium
11can be reduced to characterizing the following system in βt,γt,S t and λt.
Either F1 (St,1 − St) − F2 (St,1 − St) ≥ 0 and
γ =1




>λ tΩ if βt =0
= λtΩ if βt ∈ (0,1)
<λ tΩ if βt =1
˙ λt − (δ + ρ)λt = βtF2 (St,βt (1 − St)) + (1 − βt)wo
s − F1 (St,βt (1 − St))
+λtβtΩ(St,βt (1 − St)) (20)
OR
γ<1, λt =0 , βt =1and
F1 (γSt,(1 − St)+( 1− γ)St)=F2 (γSt,(1 − St)+( 1− γ)St)
with the addition that the transversality condition (18), and the aggregate accumulation equation
(19), must hold. 10
The above system of equations in βt,γt,S t and λt is complicated since it involves diﬀerent
regimes. However, most of its properties can be illustrated graphically using a phase diagram in
the S − λ space once it is recognized that βt and γt c a nb es o l v e da sf u n c t i o n so fSt and λt (i.e.,
βt and γt are determined by static conditions, reducing the dimension of problem to a dynamic
system in only two variables). In order to understand the properties of this system, it is helpful
to begin by distinguishing the regions in the S−λ space where β =1and γ =1from those where
these two variables are strictly smaller than 1.
2.2 The γ<1 region, and the β<1 region
Figure 1 depicts the S − λ space being cut by two lines. The vertical line at S0 is implicitly
deﬁned by the expression F2 (S,(1 − S)) = F1 (S,(1 − S)) (equation (3)). To the left of this line
γ =1 , that is, to the left all individuals with the skills to be managers are employed by ﬁrms
as managers since their marginal product is higher there. To the right γ<1, since managerial
abundance implies it is optimal to have some potential managers employed as non-managers.11
10It can be shown that the set of equilibrium requirements can be derived as the ﬁrst order conditions of a social
planners problem which maximizes the discounted utility of consumption subject to the resource constraint and
the dynamics of S. This equivalence can be used to prove that the equilibrium is pareto optimal.











The second line in Figure 1 depicts the set of points that delimit the region where β =1
versus when β<1. This relationship can be expressed as λ =
w−F2(S,(1−S))
Ω+Ω2(1−S) and is derived from
condition (15). We will denote this relationship as λβ=1 from now on. In the appendix it is proved
that this schedule is downward sloping. The region to the right of this line represents the region
where it is optimal to have all unskilled workers working in the modern technology. In contrast,
the region to the left of this line represents a region where it is optimal to leave some unskilled
workers working with the traditional technology.
The λβ=1 line plays a particularly important role since the properties of the ˙ S =0line and
the ˙ λ =0line diﬀer depending on whether they lie in the β<1 region or the β =1region. The
next step is therefore to characterize the dynamics of S and λ depending on whether the ˙ S =0
line or the ˙ λ =0line cross the λβ=1 locus.
132.2.1 The Dynamics of λ
The ˙ λ =0c a nt a k eo nt w oc o n ﬁgurations. In the ﬁrst case, this line lies only in the region where
β =1and is given by
˙ λ = F2 (S,(1 − S)) − F1 (S,(1 − S))
+λ[(δ + ρ)+Ω(S,(1 − S)) + {Ω2 (S,(1 − S)) − Ω1 (S,(1 − S))}(1 − S)] (21)
In this case, the ˙ λ =0line is a downward sloping line asymptoting at S =0and meeting the S
axis at S = S0, as depicted in Figure 2. Beyond the S
0
locus, γ<1, and λ must take value 0.







When crossing points exist, the system moves into the β<1 range, the dynamics of which we
now analyze.
Crossing points are deﬁned by the intersection of the ˙ λ =0equation with the λβ=1 equation.
These occur at values of S deﬁned by.
w − F2 (S,(1 − S))
Ω + Ω2 (S,1 − S)(1− S)
=
F1 (S,1 − S) − F2 (S,1 − S)
δ + ρ + Ω(S,(1 − S)) + [Ω2 (S,(1 − S)) − Ω1 (S,(1 − S))](1 − S)
.
(22)
There may be multiple roots to this equation.
In the β<1 region, the value of β is implicitly deﬁned by the condition:
14w − F2 (St,βt (1 − St)) = λt [Ω(St,βt (1 − St)) + Ω2 (St,βt (1 − St))βt (1 − St)] (23)
and we have:
˙ λ =( ρ + δ)λ + w − F1 (S,β (1 − S)) − λβ (1 − S)(Ω1 (S,β (1 − S)))
The ˙ λ =0l o c u si sd e ﬁned for β<1 only if there exist points of intersection deﬁned by equation
( 2 2 ) .D e n o t et h es e to fa l lS at such intersection points by Λ. For values of S,λ below the locus
λβ=1 the ˙ λ =0line is given by:
λ =
F1 (S,β (1 − S)) − w
ρ + δ − Ω1 (S,β (1 − S))β (1 − S)
. (24)
It follows from homotheticity that such locuses are horizontal lines
Lemma 1: For β<1, ˙ λ =0implies dλ
dS =0 .
Proof of this and all other results is in the appendix.
A situation with two crossing points is depicted in Figure 3. Once again, the arrows depict
the dynamics of λ







152.2.2 Dynamics of S
The ˙ S =0also has one of two diﬀerent conﬁgurations that depend on whether it crosses the λβ=1
line. In the case where ˙ S =0falls entirely in the region where β =1 , then the ˙ S =0equation is
given by the unique solution of
Ω(S,(1 − S))(1 − S)=δS, (25)
denoted S ∈ (0,1). It follows that the locus is bounded away from 1 because Ω(S,0)(0) = 0. In
this case, the ˙ S =0equation corresponds to a vertical line at S, as depicted in Figure 4. Note







It is also possible for there to be an intersection between ˙ S =0and λβ=1, which is deﬁned by
the pair:


















the movement of the system is always towards S = S as depicted in Figure 4. Conversely, if a
crossing exists, it is unique, and then the following lemma shows that the ˙ S =0line is a horizontal
schedule in the region where β<1.
Lemma 2: For β<1, ˙ S =0implies dλ
dS =0 .








2.3 Steady States and Transitional Dynamics
N o wt h a tw eh a v ep r e s e n t e dt h ed i ﬀerent possible conﬁguration for the ˙ S =0locus and the
˙ λ =0locus, we can focus on steady states and transitional dynamics, where steady states occur
at intersections of the ˙ S =0and ˙ λ =0schedules. Although ˙ S =0and the ˙ λ =0locus each have
two possible conﬁgurations, there are actually only three relevant equilibrium conﬁgurations, and
t h e s ea r ed e s c r i b e di nL e m m a3 .
Lemma 3: Either (1) ˙ λ =0does not intersect λβ=1 and therefore crosses ˙ S =0in the β =1
region. (Figures 6 and 8)
Or (2) ˙ λ =0intersects λβ=1 and intersects ˙ S =0at a value of S to the right of the last
intersection point between λβ=1 and ˙ λ =0 .( F i g u r e9 )
Or (3) ˙ λ =0intersects λβ=1 and does not intersect ˙ S =0 .( F i g u r e7 )
We analyze each conﬁguration represented in Figures 6-9 seperately. Figure 6 depicts the
phase diagram and transitional dynamics of the steady state corresponding to the situation where
neither locus crosses λβ=1. Here the unique steady state of the system is the point A where tra-
17ditional production stops entirely. An economy starting without skills in the modern technology
will eventually develop a positive steady state skill level, and full modern production. In the
example depicted in Figure 6, the unique steady state is characterized by a positive managerial
skill premium (since the steady state value of λ is positive). This is due to the fact that the
vertical ˙ S l i n ei st ot h el e f to fS
0
. If instead the ˙ S =0line were to the right of S0, there would
be no managerial skill premium in the steady state. This case is depicted by the dotted line for
˙ S =0in the ﬁgure, and it intersects with the ˙ λ =0line at a point where λ is equal to zero. In
this case managerial skills are accumulated to the point of abundance, with the returns to the
skill being fully dissipated in the resulting steady state. Note that such dissipation of the returns
to knowledge arises even though there are no market imperfections, which contrasts with most









Figure 7 depicts the phase space for the situation corresponding to crossing of both loci with
the λβ=1 line. Here again, there is a unique steady state and it is reached independently of the
economy’s starting position. Now, however, the economy’s steady state sees it remain fully mired
in the traditional technology. Though there is a positive managerial skill premium in the steady
state (λ>0), no one has incentive to accumulate skills in the modern technology. An economy
18inheriting a positive skill level will see it eventually approach zero along the transition path since
the endogenous creation of new managers does not oﬀset the exogenous cohort turnover rate. In
such an economy, skill premia in the modern technology will be steadily rising as it approaches
the steady state. The economy is unable to sustain modern production because δ is too high to
maintain a stock of skilled individuals from whom the unskilled can learn. Any such stock that is
exogenously created, say through an explicit government training program, or through migration










Figure 8 depicts a situation in which only the ˙ S =0locus intersects λβ=1. Here again the
unique steady state of the system is at the point A where all individuals work in the modern
technology, and there remains a positive skill premium. Transitional dynamics are similar to
those in Figure 6. Even an economy inheriting zero skills will eventually converge on a steady
state with fully modernized production. This is also an economy with relatively high δ as indicated
by the location of the dS
dt =0locus, however a distinction from the situation in Figure 7 would
arise from the economy below having a lower value of ρ. If ρ is suﬃciently low, as depicted below,
the dλ
dt =0l o c u si se n t i r e l yi nt h eβ =1region which ensures an intersection of the dS
dt =0in the
region β =1 . Intuitively, this is a case where the future is valued highly enough to favor suﬃcient
19investment in managerial skill acquisition to oﬀset the relatively high depletion of skills. This
ensures a steady state where all unskilled workers are proﬁtably placed into the new technology,









Finally, Figure 9 depicts the situation that occurs when only the ˙ λ =0locus intersects the
λβ=1 line, or where if the ˙ S =0locus also intersects it does so at a value of S to the right of the
last intersection point between λβ=1 and ˙ λ =0 . Here, in addition to the stable steady state, point
A, where skills are accumulated and the economy is fully modern, there exists an unstable steady
state at S =0 , the point labelled B. An economy starting at B would remain in the traditional
technology, but the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of skilled managers would lead
to production with the modern technology. Because management skills are accumulated through
production, the number of managers would increase, and so too would modern production, until
eventually all production is modern, and the point A is reached. Note that in this ﬁgure there is
a qualitatively diﬀerent case depicted for the dashed ˙ S =0line denoted ˙ S =0 ( 2 ) . This occurs
when the ˙ S =0l o c u sd o e sn o ti n t e r s e c tt h eλβ=1 line. Here the horizontal arm of the ˙ S =0line
does not exist, but a similar steady state to A, denoted C, would also ensue. In this later case,













In situations depicted in Figures 6 and 8 the economy converges to steady states which may or
may not have skill premia but in which the traditional technology is completely shut down. Skills
may or may not be in full abundance. For the situation in Figure 7, conversely, the traditional
technology remains in full use and no skills are accumulated, even though there is a positive
premium associated with being skilled. Recall that this outcome (persistence of traditional pro-
duction) occurs only if the ˙ λ =0locus intersects the λβ=1 locus. Finally, the situation in Figure
9 implies hysteresis. Economies without skill will not develop the modern technology, but even
small amounts of skill will eventually lead to full diﬀusion. Such an economy would experience
rapid growth in light of even a small initiative that was able to introduce some skilled workers.
The ensuing situation for any particular economy depends critically on the relative locations
of the loci sketched above. Since these are determined by the values of exogenous parameters,
δ and ρ, we can characterize the mapping between the values of δ and ρ and the equilibrium
conﬁgurations. This is done in Proposition 1 and illustrated in Figure 10.
21Proposition 1: For a given productivity level in the modern technology, F, a n dag i v e n
managerial learning technology Ω the ρ − δ space can be divided into three regions
(a) For low values of ρ and δ, called region A, the economy converges to a unique steady state
with all production occurring in the modern technology.12
b) For high values of ρ and δ, called region B, the economy converges to a unique steady state
with all production occurring in the traditional technology.13
c) For intermediate values of ρ and δ, called region C, if the economy starts with S =0 ,i t
remains there with all production occurring in the traditional technology. If however the economy
starts with S>0, it converges to a steady state with all production occurring in the modern
technology.
Furthermore, there exists a δ∗,s u c ht h a ti f δ<δ ∗, then there is no managerial skill premium
in a steady state where all production occurs with the modern technology.14
Figure 10 summarizes this proposition’s implications for possible steady state outcomes. Note
that Region A corresponds to the dynamics illustrated in Figures 6 and 8. Region B corresponds
to the dynamics illustrated in Figure 7 and region C corresponds to the dynamics of Figure 9.
In the lower left corner of Figure 10 (i.e. low values of δ and ρ) lies the region of δ and ρ where
an economy with an arbitrary level of initial skills (including zero) will fully transform to modern
production. If in this case δ<δ ∗, there will be no managerial premium in the steady state. The
disappearance of a managerial premium follows directly from the low labor turnover which ensures
steady state skills are very high. For higher values of δ, while staying in Region A, the modern
technology will always fully develop, but the higher values of δ will allow the persistence of a skill
premium in the steady state. For high values of both δ and ρ, as in Region B, development of the
modern technology is not sustainable. An economy inheriting some skilled managers, or receiving
in-migration of them, would utilize the technology, and would also train some further managers
in its use. However, the low rate of skill creation is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the high labor turnover
and therefore such an economy will eventually see such skills vanish from the population as the
economy reverts back to full use of traditional technology. The middle region, region C, exhibits
a knife edge type of hysteresis. The economy’s low valuation of the future (high ρ), implies that
12This region is deﬁned by a critical value, denoted k
∗,s u c ht h a ti f ρ + δ<k
∗, all production eventually occurs
using the modern technology.
13This region is deﬁned by a critical value of δ, denoted δ
∗∗ such that for δ ≥ δ
∗∗, there exists a corresponding
value of ρ, denoted ρ
∗ such that, if ρ>ρ
∗ the economy converges to a unique steady state with all production
occurring in the traditional technology.
14In this case, the steady state value of λ is zero.
22without skills originally present, no unskilled worker would ﬁnd it worthwhile to incur currently
low productivity in order to accumulate managerial skill. However, with even a small amount
present, they will be used in production, and since skills in the population depreciate slowly since
δ is relative low, this will eventually lead to their diﬀusion through the population. The ﬁnal













Though on the job skills will be accumulated in all economies, the model provides an interpre-
tation of when these will lead to a take-oﬀ into the new technology, and thus a growth miracle,
and when eﬀorts at implementing new technologies will fail. Speciﬁcally, as illustrated in Figures
6 and 8, even an economy without any managerial skills will devote resources to acquiring the
new technology since both δ and ρ are suﬃciently low. Starting at S =0 , growth rates will be
high, and returns to experience will be large at the start and eventually decline, perhaps to zero,
in the eventual steady state. The factor in common in both the ﬁgures is a high valuation of the
future. In extreme contrast, Figure 7 depicts an economy with both a relatively low valuation
of the future, and high turnover of individuals. Such an economy would also experience some
growth were it to receive an infusion of skills from abroad. However, even a large injection of
skilled workers would not transform this economy to modern production, instead, it will converge
23back to the traditional technology, along a path which sees constantly declining output. The
middling case is given in Figure 9. Such an economy will not converge to modern production
without some exogenous inﬂux of skilled workers. Any initiative which does this, though, will
lead to rapid learning, diﬀusion, and sustained growth to the new steady state where there is a
permanently higher level of income.
3 Implications for Growth Accounting
A natural question to ask is whether the process of managerial skill acquisition we have presented
could be an important component in development process in the sense of potentially explaining
a substantial fraction of cross-country diﬀerences in income. At a ﬁrst pass, the answer from the
growth accounting literature appears to be a clear no. This literature (see for example Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997)) ﬁnds that skills, whether acquired on-the-job or by schooling, account
f o ro n l yas m a l lf r a c t i o no fi n c o m ed i ﬀerences across countries. In particular, in order to evaluate
the potential role of on-the-job skill acquisition, this literature uses estimates of the returns to
job experience to calculate the share of income paid to on-the-job acquired skills. This share of
income is found to be small and it is generally inferred that no story of on-the-job skill acquisition
can have the potential to explain an important fraction of cross-country income diﬀerentials. In
this section, we argue that such an inference would not follow if the data were generated by the
type of managerial skill acquisition process presented here. In this discussion, we will examine
what our model implies about standard growth accounting exercises, under the assumption that
returns on-the-job are estimated using experience proﬁles. We will illustrate why standard growth
accounting exercises would not properly assess the role of on-the-job learning if the data were
generated by our model. Since the impact upon growth accounting depends upon whether a
cross-section of countries or a time-series is considered, we explore both cases.
3.1 Returns to experience in a cross-section
Growth accounting in a cross-section involves decomposing diﬀerences in (log) income-per-worker
into components associated with factor accumulation and a residual. For example, consider the












Li is experience per worker in country i, αi is the share paid to experience, Xi is some
composite of physical and human capital, (usually entering seperately, but bundled together for
simplicity here) together with its share, γi and Ai is the residual. The term αi can be computed
using estimates from a Mincer type earnings regression based on micro data. The residual term,
Ai, is interpreted as country i0s productivity. In explaining cross-country diﬀerences in output
per capita say between two countries i and j, the term:
lnAi − lnAj
ln Yi




is usually interpreted as the contribution of factors that have not been purposefully accumulated.
This is because it is assumed that the contribution of diﬀerences in skills learned on-the-job is
reﬂected in the returns to the experience. In order to see how this may be misleading, now
suppose that countries i and j have diﬀerent values of δ and ρ,and that the growth process is
driven by on-the-job managerial skills acquisition as we have modelled it. Assume for now that
δi ≤ δ∗. Furthermore, assume that country i has a low value of ρ so that it lies in Region A in
Figure 10, whereas country j has a high value of δand ρ so that it lies in region B.
Now consider an accounting exercise aiming to explain level diﬀerences in income between
countries i and j, using observations drawn from the steady state. Income per-capita is higher in
country i because it has more managerial skills, which have been accumulated through the use of
the new technology. However, returns to work experience estimated from micro data is precisely
zero in country i. This is because managerial skills are abundant in the a steady state and
hence have a zero return. Consequently, all of the diﬀerence in income levels that was caused by
diﬀerences in on-the-job learning will be picked up by the residual. This may lead researchers to
incorrectly interpret the cause of the diﬀerence in income per capita between i and j as being due
to a disembodied factor, such as diﬀerences in technological opportunities, since it is attributed
to the residual.
Note that the same over-attribution of diﬀerences to the residual would also occur were country
i to be located in the region A where δi >δ ∗. Here, experience diﬀerences would now be measured
to pick up some of the diﬀerence in output per worker, but this measured contribution need bear
no relationship to the true contribution. In fact, the degree of understatement would be inversely
related to the size of δ.
253.2 Returns to experience in a time series
The previous discussion illustrated why growth accounting exercises, when performed on a cross-
section of countries, may greatly understate the role of on-the-job learning in explaining levels of
income-per-worker. In this section we examine whether such an inference problem will also arise
when growth accounting is performed using time series data for a given country. Thus consider
a single country that is experiencing growth in output per capita according to our process of
managerial skills acquisition. In attempting to pick up the contribution of various factors to the













where x,y and exp are all in per-capita terms, and A represents the TFP residual. If experience
were directly measured, i.e. if the utilized data included information about the technology with
which workers work, then this procedure would provide an accurate depiction of experience’s (or
managerial skills’) contribution to the growth in per capita output, as
e˙ xp
exp would be positive while
the economy grows and αt would be greater than zero. It is thus, conceptually at least, possible
to estimate the impact of all learning by doing on output per capita if the appropriate data were
available.
However, direct measures of on-the-job skills are generally not available. Instead skills learned
through experience are usually proxied as a weighted average of the economy’s age structure, or
a weighted average of time in the work-force. In our example, economy i experiences growth
in output per capita all the way through its transition due to an increase in the fraction of the
population which has managerial skill. But the age, and hence measured experience, is unchanged
through the transition. Thus proxying experience by the age structure or time in the labor force
would, in data generated by our model, lead to the ﬁnding that
e˙ xp
exp =0 . The outcome is therefore
the same as in the cross-section: a growth accounting exercises performed on a time series will
most likely attribute all of the on-the-job learning to the residual term,
˙ A
A. This again would
lead to the erroneous attribution of country i0s income growth to an unexplained residual factor
i n s t e a do fi t st r u es o u r c e ;m a n a g e r i a ls k i lls purposefully accumulated on the job.
264 Migration incentives
Theories of cross-country growth diﬀerences that have attributed signiﬁcant roles to embodied
skills generally imply migration incentives that are perverse in comparison with actual migration
ﬂows. This view is summarized in Romer’s (1995) critique on Mankiw’s (1995) emphasis on formal
training in his explanation of cross-country diﬀerences. This arises for standard neo-classical
reasons. Since the skills are relatively abundant in developed countries, returns to them should
be low there, and there should thus be incentive for skilled individuals in developed countries to
migrate to those undeveloped ones where managerial skills are scarce. In the present framework,
skills are embodied and fully rewarded, suggesting that a similar set of incentives should be in
place. It turns out, however, that this is not generally the case.
Here we shall consider migration incentives between two countries with access to the same
set of technologies, modern and traditional, but diﬀering in one of three ways that will generate
dramatic outcome diﬀerences. The ﬁrst two sources of diﬀerence are fundamentals: the discount
factor, ρ; and the population turnover rate, δ. As we have seen previously, countries with higher
values of each of these are more likely to converge to a steady state where the traditional tech-
nology dominates. Conversely, countries with lower values of these variables are more likely to be
in a steady state where all production occurs using the modern technology. Thirdly we consider
migration incentives implied by the hysteresis case illustrated in Figure 9 where fundamentals are
identical.
When considering incentives to migrate, we focus on instantaneous incentives. If a wage
payment is higher — for a given skill level — in country i versus country j, we will say that such
a worker has an incentive to migrate from country j to country i. Our primary focus is on the
incentive for skilled managers to migrate from richer to poorer countries. We omit discussion of
the migration incentives for unskilled workers since they are quite standard in the model in the
sense that there is never an incentive for an unskilled worker to migrate from a rich country to a
poor country.
4.1 Migration Incentives due to Diﬀerences in ρ
Consider two countries, rich, r,a n dp o o r ,p, with identical values of δ but with diﬀering discount
rates such that ρr <ρ p. We choose values of the respective ρ so that the rich country is in Region
A in Figure 10, while the poor country is in Region B. Note that such a conﬁguration is only
27possible if δ>δ ∗.
This choice of ρs ensures that the poor country will be in a steady state in which all production
occurs in the traditional technology, and that the rich country will be in a steady state where all
production is in the modern technology. Also, in the rich country’s steady state there is ongoing
training of individuals in managerial skills, whereas in the poor country’s steady state, managerial
skills are not being produced because no one is working with the modern technology. This does
not mean that the managerial skills would not be valuable in the poor country. Speciﬁcally, if one
skilled manager from the rich country, where skills are widespread, were to migrate to the poor
country, he would be able to set up production and utilize the modern technology. Moreover,
the unskilled workers he employed would also acquire valuable managerial skills and therefore be
willing to “pay” for these by working at a wage below the current wage with the old technology.
This would generate a positive return to managerial skill and would seem to suggest strong
incentives for migration of skilled individuals from the rich country to the poor one. It turns out,
however, that this is not the case since as Proposition 2 indicates, the managerial wage in the
rich country is higher than the managerial wage that one would achieve in the poor country.15
Proposition 2:I n c o m e d i ﬀerences generated by diﬀerences in ρ across countries do not
generate incentives for managers in a richer country to migrate to a poorer country.
The reason managers in the rich country do not want to migrate to the poor country is that
the wage they can achieve is higher in the rich country (i.e., low ρ country). How can that be given
that managers are more abundant in the rich country? Recall that wage payments to a manager
are made up of two components: the marginal product in production and the teaching value.
T h el o w e rv a l u eo fρ, which makes the country richer, does this by inducing more individuals to
accumulate managerial skills. This ensures a high teaching value of managers and since many
more unskilled workers are willing to learn managerial skills, this guarantees overall managerial
15The managerial wage in the poor country is given by
w
s (δ)=F1 (Z,1) + λe Ω1 (Z,1), (27)
where λ is given by
λ =
F1 (Z,1) − w
δ + ρ − e Ω1 (Z,1)
,
and where Z is the smallest root of:
F1 (Z,1) − w
δ + ρ − e Ω1 (Z,1)
=
w − F2 (Z,1)
e Ω2 (Z,1)
.
28productivity, and hence wages, are higher in the rich country.16
4.2 Migration Incentives due to Diﬀerences in δ
Let us now consider the situation with two countries in steady state which diﬀer only in terms of
δ, but have the same value of ρ.T h eﬁrst county is poor since it has a high value of δ, denoted δp,
which leads it to use only the traditional technology. This country has a parameter conﬁguration
that places it in region B of Figure 10. The second country is rich due to a lower value of δ,
denoted δr which leads all individuals to work with the modern technology. This places the second
c o u n t r yi ne i t h e rr e g i o nAo rCo fF i g u r e1 0 . 17 Incentives for migration generated by diﬀerences
in δ are somewhat complicated. In order to understand the incentives for skilled managers to
migrate from rich to poor countries, in Figure 11, we plot the wage of skilled workers as a function
of δ. Recall that the wage of managers can be expressed as follows:
ws (δ)=F1 (Z,1) + λe Ω1 (Z,1), (28)
where Z is the ratio of managers to unskilled workers in the modern technology. As δ changes,
wages of managers change due to changes in both Z and λ. For the case where δ is in region
B, there are no skilled managers in the steady state, which may give the impression that Z,a n d
hence ws,a r en o tw e l ld e ﬁned. However, this is not the case since, as seen in Figure 7, there is a
well deﬁned steady state value for λ18 and this value of λ pins down the relevant value of Z by
the optimality for β,w h e nβ<1. This condition can be expressed as:
λ =
w − F2 (Z,1)
e Ω2 (Z,1)
.
16The ﬁnding is consistent with the evidence presented in Acemoglu and Newman (2002). They report averages
of the ratio of managerial to production workers in six OECD countries, all of which are below 25%. In contrast,
the average supervision ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa is 41%. The explanation provided here would be that the lower
steady state value of managerial skills (due to the higher rate of discount, ρ) in the Sub-Saharan economies implies
that workers are less willing to pay the cost of being a low productivity worker required to obtain them.
17If a country has a parameter conﬁguration which places it in Region C of Figure 10, we consider here that such
a country is in the high output steady state.
18This λ is given by
λ =
F1 (Z,1) − w
δ + ρ − e Ω1 (Z,1)
,
where Z is the smallest root of:
F1 (Z,1) − w
δ + ρ − e Ω1 (Z,1)
=
w − F2 (Z,1)
e Ω2 (Z,1)
.
29For the case where the steady state is characterized by exclusive use of the the modern
technology, then the relvant values for Z and λ are determined by ˙ S =0and ˙ λ =0conditions










The important aspect to notice in Figure 11 is that the steady state relationship between ws
and δ has an inverse U shape. For smaller values of δ,u pt oδm, the relationship is increasing,
while for values of δ>δ m the relationship is decreasing. The value δm is the δ given by the
boundary between regions C and B in Figure 10. Accordingly, to the right of δm,t h er e l a t i o n s h i p
between ws and δ is negative and a country in this region is characterized by underdevelopment.
To the left of δm, the country is characterized by exclusive use of the modern technology and is
always richer (in terms of output-per-capita) than countries with δ>δ m. The non-monotonic
relationship between ws and δ implies that a manager in a developed/rich country does not
necessarily want to migrate to a poor country where his skills are less abundant. In fact, for
any given poor country, there exist a range of δs( w i t hδ<δ m) such that, a country in this
range is characterized (in steady state) by both the exclusive use of the modern technology and
the absence of an incentive to migrate to the poorer country. This observation is summarized in
Proposition 3. Note however, that if the δ of the rich country is suﬃciently small, then a skilled
30manager will have an incentive to migrate to the poor country; since for a suﬃciently small δ in
the rich country, the managerial wage is lower than in the poor country. Once again, the reason
why a manager in a rich country may not want to migrate to the poor country is because the
teaching value of having skill is greater in the rich country.
Proposition 3. Cross-country income diﬀerences generated by diﬀerences in δ only generate
generate incentives for managers to migrate to poor countries only if δ in the rich country is
suﬃciently low.
4.3 Diﬀerences due to hysteresis
Now consider two economies with identical ρ,δ values that lie in the hysteresis area between the
bold lines in Figure 10. Country r is at a steady state like that sketched at point A, in Figure 9
while the poor country p is at a steady state corresponding to no skill acquisition — corresponding
to the point B in Figure 9. In such a case, skilled individuals have a strict incentive to migrate
to the place where skills are scarce.
Proposition 4. When cross-country diﬀerences are driven by hysteresis and two countries
with identical fundamentals have diﬀerent levels of development, there is incentive for skilled
individuals to migrate from the rich to the poor country.
Here, the migration incentives have a neo-classical favour. The country abundant in skilled
managers will see out-migration to the otherwise identical country which has not yet developed.
Moreover, the introduction of a small number of skilled managers into the poor country will
s e ei tt r a n s i t i o na l o n gt h ep a t hi nF i g u r e9f r o mt h ep o i n tB to eventually reach the same
level of output per capita as the rich country, with full use of the modern technology. This
“seeding” of skilled individuals and the eventual mushrooming of these skills throughout the
sector, provides an interpretation of the Bangladeshi (garment) and Indonesian (lumber) examples
in the introduction. In both cases, small numbers of skilled workers were transplanted into the
poor country — by training locals in the Bangladesi example, and by transplanting skilled Koreans
in the Indonesian example. The diﬀusion of their skills through on the job learning to future
entrepreneurs then lead to rapid and large follow-on eﬀects.
315 Discussion
We have maintained the assumption throughout of perfectly competitive labor markets which
can adequately coordinate the acquisition of on-the-job managerial skills. There are at least two
reasons to doubt this in reality: labor may be liquidity constrained; and ﬁrms may not be able
to write binding long-term contracts with labor. In this section we brieﬂy discuss these issues,
leaving to future research a more thorough examination.
As we saw, in transition, there are skill premia, λ>0. Unskilled labor have low marginal
products and accept low wages in order to learn the managerial skills and receive higher wages
in future. However, especially at the start of this process, the net present value of such skills
is high. Thus competitive factor markets will price wages for the unskilled at low, and perhaps
negative levels. We have not constrained wages for the unskilled downwards, but in reality it
is extremely unlikely that, in developing countries, labor could pay for the future value of the
organizational skills that they acquire today, through low or negative wages. Individuals are likely
to be constrained by present consumption needs, and to be unable to ﬁnance present consumption
out of future earnings.
This would be less of a problem if labor could write binding future employment contracts
with employers (or outside ﬁnanciers). With such contracts, labor could be paid a wage suﬃcient
to maintain subsistence and above the market clearing wage while unskilled, and then, under
contract, be forced to repay this by working as managers at wages below market clearing when they
are ready to do so. The existence of such contracts would allow full mimicry of the competitive
allocation that we have analyzed above. However, it is extremely unlikely that such contracts
could work in reality. Firstly, in many countries, few courts would uphold the right of employers
to restrict labor through contracts such as those above. Secondly, the discussion assumes away the
possibility of worker moral-hazard, which is likely to become particularly severe when workers are
being paid below market wages and would like to precipitate an employment termination. This
problem could again be solved by contracts which allowed labor mobility but enforced repayment
to either the ﬁrm or ﬁnancier of the initial skills acquisition. However, even in developed countries,
such ﬁnancing schemes are far from complete.
If such on-the-job managerial skills acquisition does play a central role in productivity im-
provement, then it should be the case that countries that have experienced dramatic growth
should have exhibited institutions that, to some extent, were able to overcome these problems.
32In contrast, the lack of such institutions may underpin the problems of skilling and technology
acquisition that have been identiﬁed in many LDCs today.
Institutions that come to mind are those that somehow link labor to ﬁrms for long stretches
of time and thus provide incentives for ﬁrms to overcome workers’ liquidity constraints and
accumulate the necessary skills without worrying about future appropriability of returns. Or,
institutions that allow workers to overcome these problems on their own, and thus become skilled.
There is certainly evidence of such institutions in both Japan and South Korea which were
both characterized by labor markets with signiﬁcant worker bonding. There is also evidence
of reduced labor mobility increasing ﬁrms’ incentives to induce on-the-job skills acquisition in
the developing past of industrialized countries, see for example Bessen (2003) and the case of
19th century Massachusetts cotton manufacturing. Singapore, in contrast, followed a diﬀerent
approach which explicitly recognized the externality to such on the job training in a market
where worker mobility was assured. The government there set up a Skill Development Fund
which collected a levy of one percent of payroll from employers to subsidize training of low paid
workers (Lall 1999, p. 36). Alternatively, Germany developed a ‘cooperative’ training system
which lead to practical training being coordinated between employer, employees and government.
Apprentices took low wages, employers contributed to part of the costs, and government provided
some of the infrastructure, while union groups took an active role in discouraging worker poaching
(Lall 1999, p.38). A detailed analysis of these country studies is beyond the scope of this paper,
but further examination of such cases is certainly motivated by the ﬁndings here.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have presented a model of managerial skill acquisition where unskilled individuals
invest to obtain skills by accepting employment in ﬁrms where managerial skills are present. This
process of skills acquisition is related to, but distinct from, a previously large literature on skills
acquisition through learning-by-doing. Learning-by-doing emphasizes increases in productivity
arising from repetition of tasks through time. Our process of managerial skills acquisition involves
learning from working with a manager, and thus arises when undertaking distinct and comple-
mentary tasks. This process may have potentially important implications for understanding why
technologies may be so diﬃcult to transplant across countries. Unlike the learning-by-doing liter-
ature, and previous studies which have similarly emphasized the role of emodied skills (as opposed
33to disembodied knowledge), the process we posit here yields implications which we demonstrate
to be consistent with the empirical record.
Although this process of managerial skill acquisition is modelled in a manner that allows
knowledge to be entirely internalized by individuals, we have shown that it nevertheless leads to
outcomes that resemble those obtained in endogenous growth models with market imperfections.
For example, we show that in this setup, agents will purposefully accumulate managerial skill
knowing full well that the return to these skills will dissipate over time and, in the steady state,
possibly be equal to zero. We have shown how such a process could lead astray growth accounting
exercises since diﬀerences across countries in managerial skill would most likely be attributed to
diﬀerences in total factor productivity as opposed to being properly attributed to on-the-job
experience. Finally, we have also shown how this model can explain why managers may not
migrate from rich countries, where they are abundant, to poor countries where there are scarce,
even though the underlying technology satisﬁes constant returns to scale. The explanation of this
latter eﬀect is the presence of a teaching premium for managers in the rich country which will
generally be higher that in the poor country.
There are many possible extensions to this model. As previously discussed, it may be war-
ranted to examine the properties of this type of on-the-job learning process in the absence of
perfect markets. This could help understand the institutional and policy features of less devel-
oped economies that are conducive (or inimical) to this process of skills acquisition when markets
do not fully reward it. An alternative type of market failure may arise when the modern sector is
subject to thick market externalites. In the presence of even minor externalities of this sort, the
process of managerial skill acquisition as modelled here could explain the emergence of a poverty
trap whereby a poor country does not invest in managerial skill acquisition simply because the
modern sector is small due to the lack of managers.
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= sign[−(Ω − Ω2 (1 − S))(F21 − F22) − (w − F2)(Ω1 − Ω2 +( Ω21 − Ω22)(1− S) − Ω2)]
The ﬁrst term in the square brackets is negative. From HDO of Ω we have:
Ω1S + Ω2 (1 − S)=0 (29)
⇒ (Ω21 − Ω22)(1− S)+( Ω1 − Ω2)=( Ω12 − Ω11)S
which implies that the second term becomes
−(−Ω2 +( Ω12 − Ω11)S) (30)
37From the homogeneity of degree -1 of the function Ω1 we have
Ω11S + Ω12 (1 − S)=−Ω1




+ SΩ12 = Ω2
implying that SΩ12 − Ω2 > 0. Using this and the fact that Ω11 < 0, the second term, expression
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< 0:˙ λ =0 |β=1 ⇒
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(F11 − F12 − F21 + F22)
³








Since e Ωij > 0, e Ωii < 0, Fii < 0 and Fij > 0 it follows that (sign) dλ
dS < 0.¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : Rewrite expression (24) as λ =
F1(S,β(1−S))−w
ρ+δ−e Ω1(S,β(1−S)) and diﬀerentiate with

























Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition yields:
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.
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38Since e Ω and F a r eH D 1 ,w eh a v e :
F11S + F12β (1 − S)=0
F21S + F22β (1 − S)=0
e Ω11S + e Ω12β (1 − S)=0
e Ω21S + e Ω22β (1 − S)=0 .
These equalities imply that the terms in large parentheses on the right hand side of (34) equal
zero, so that dλ
dS =0 .¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : ˙ S =0implies
Ω(S,β (1 − S))β (1 − S) ≡ e Ω(S,β (1 − S)) = δS. (35)
Diﬀerentiating yields
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¶
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Since e Ω is HD1, e Ω1S + e Ω2β (1 − S)=e Ω = δS, where the last inequality holds at ˙ S =0 . Using





















Since Fi and e Ωi are HD0, we have:
SF21 + β (1 − S)F22 =0
Se Ω21 + β (1 − S) e Ω22 =0 .




























P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :
We rule out the case where ˙ λ =0intersects λβ=1 and has an intersection at ˙ S =0in the


















For this proof it is simpler to use the e Ω function :
e Ω(S,1 − S) ≡ Ω(S,1 − S)(1− S)
Since Ω is HDO the function e Ω is HD1.
Assign the following λ values: For S deﬁned in (25) we have:
λ4 =
F1 − F2




Consider any two elements S1,S 2 of Λ: and consider an S∗ with S1 <S ∗ <S 2, such that the










δ + ρ + e Ω∗
2 − e Ω∗
1
where F∗ ≡ F (S∗,1 − S∗) and e Ω∗ = e Ω(S∗,1 − S∗).
Clearly, for this case to exist it is necessary that: λ4 >λ 3 >λ 2 >λ 1.
From the HD1 of e Ω we have e Ω1S + e Ω2 (1 − S)=e Ω. At S = S, e Ω = δS, combining these
implies that, at S = S
e Ω2 =
³




For the remainder of the proof e Ω and F will denote the respective functions evaluated at S = S.
Applying these, λ4 >λ 3 implies that:
F1 − F2
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³
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>
w − F2 ³













w − F2 ³











δ − e Ω1
´ >
w − F2 ³









































δ − e Ω1
´
(w − F2) (39)
⇒
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δ − e Ω1 + ρ
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41The ﬁrst inequality follows since e Ω∗
2 < 0, the second since w>F ∗
2 as β<1 for S = S∗, the third
since e Ω∗


































Once again utilizing (38) inequalities (40) and (43) can be expressed respectively as:
(F1 − w)S





















Adding the two inequalities above makes the w terms cancels and yields:
F1S



















δ − e Ω1
.
Rearranging terms in this expression implies:
F1S
³

































But since S∗ > S this is false by the concavity of F. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
P r o o fo fp a r ta :T h e˙ λ =0crosses the λβ=1 locus if and only if there exists at least one value
of S for which,
w − F2 (·)
Ω(·)+Ω2 (·)(1− S)
−
F1 (·) − F2 (·)
δ + ρ + Ω(·)+[ Ω2 (·) − Ω1 (·)](1 − S)
> 0, (46)
i.e. if the set Λ is non-empty. Suppose that ρ + δ =0 . Then, necessarily, condition (46) fails.
Because F1 > w and Ω1 > 0. Since the second expression is monotonically decreasing in ρ + δ
and the ﬁrst is unaﬀected, there necessarily exists a unique value of ρ + δ such that
w − F2 (·)
Ω(·)+Ω2 (·)(1− S)
−
F1 (·) − F2 (·)
δ + ρ + Ω(·)+[ Ω2 (·) − Ω1 (·)](1 − S)
=0 . (47)
42Let k∗ denote the value of ρ+δ solving (47) with equality. If and only if ρ+δ<k ∗ the functions
do not cross and situations in Figures 6 or 8 occur. In these, the system’s unique steady state,
involves no one working in the traditional technology.
Proof of part b: S0 is deﬁned from equation (2). Consider S deﬁned in (25). I fa n do n l yi f
S>S 0, then the ˙ S =0locus lies to the right of the S0 locus. This conﬁguration is not depicted
but similar to that in Figure 6 with the relative positions of the ˙ S =0and S = S0 lines reversed.
In this steady state, λ =0 . In any conﬁguration where ˙ S =0lies to the left of S0, (Figures 6,7 or
8) the steady state involves λ>0. Thus δ∗ =
Ω(S0,1−S0)(1−S0)
S0 .
















For δ<δ ∗∗, the ˙ S =0l o c u sd o e sn o ti n t e r s e c tt h eλβ=1 line and an interior steady state exists.
If δ + ρ<k ∗, there is also no intersection with the ˙ λ =0locus and the unique steady state is
in the interior, as in Figure 6. If δ + ρ ≥ k∗, there is an interesection and the case of Figure 9
applies, implying hysteresis. For δ ≥ δ∗∗, the ˙ S =0locus intersects the λβ=1 line. Note that, from
condition (3) δ∗∗ >δ ∗. Whether the economy is in the hysteresis case, or the stable traditional
steady state with full use of traditional technology depends on the location of the ˙ λ =0line. The





















































w − F2 (·)
.
Note that since αF1 +( 1− α)F2 > w for any α ∈ [0,1],ρ ∗ > 0. For ρ>ρ ∗, the ˙ λ =0locus
intersects the λβ=1 line below the intersection with ˙ S =0 , so that the situation in Figure 7
occurs, and the unique steady state is full use of the traditional technology. Under the converse,
the situation in 9 occurs and hysteresis is the outcome.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Skilled Managers: We prove these individuals do not migrate from the rich country by demon-
strating that the steady state skilled wage, ws, is strictly decreasing in ρ, ceteris parabus. From
Proposition 1 recall that the steady state allocation of labor varies with the sum ρ + δ depicted
by the downward sloping straight line in Figure 10. For given δ<δ 0, there thus exists a unique
43value of ρ, denote it ρc ≡ k∗ − δ, such that for ρ>ρ c,β=0(corresponding to the conﬁguration
in Figure 7) and the country is poor. For ρ ≤ ρc,β=1(corresponding to the conﬁgurations in
F i g u r e s6 ,8 ,o r9 )a n dt h ec o u n t r yi sr i c h . For ρ ≤ ρc then
ws (ρ)=F1 (·)+λΩ1 (·)(1− S).
Where steady state S is determined by
δS = Ω(·)(1− S)
and
λ =
F1 (·) − F2 (·)




F1 (·) − F2 (·)
δ + ρ + Ω(·)+Ω2 (·)(1− S) − Ω1 (·)(1− S)
Ω1 (·)(1− S).




ws (ρ)=F1 (Z,1) + λe Ω1 (Z,1), (48)
where Z ≡
βS
1−S. The value of λ is then given by:
λ =
F1 (Z,1) − w
δ + ρ − e Ω1 (Z,1)
.
And Z is the smallest root of:
F1 (Z,1) − w
δ + ρ − e Ω1 (Z,1)
=
w − F2 (Z,1)
e Ω2 (Z,1)
,
corresponding to the value of Z at the point A in Figure 7, or the point λp in Figure A2. By
inspection of the ﬁgure it is immediate that, as ρ increases, the curved schedule shifts downward
to the left, implying that λ falls. This implies that Z increases since λ also satisﬁes λ =
w−F2(Z,1)
e Ω2(Z,1) .
Since Z increases and λ falls, it is immediate from (48) that ws (ρ) is decreasing in ρ for this
range of ρ as well. Consequently, since ws (ρ) is everywhere strictly decreasing in ρ,t h e r ei sa
strict incentive for skilled individuals to migrate from the poor to the rich country.
Unskilled workers: The wage to working in the traditional technology is the same in each
country, w. In the poor country, all individuals strictlyp r e f e rt ow o r kw i t ht h et r a d i t i o n a lt e c h -
nology, β =0 . In the rich country, the unskilled strictly prefer to work in the modern technology
44instead of working with the traditional technology which is still avaiable to them, i.e. β =1 .
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At the point B, the introduction of a small number of skilled individuals implies:
ws (B)=F1 (Z,1) + λBe Ω1 (Z,1), (50)
where Z ≡
βS
1−S. The value of λ is then given by:
λ =
F1 (Z,1) − w
δ + ρ − e Ω1 (Z,1)
.
And Z is the smallest root of:
F1 (Z,1) − w
δ + ρ − e Ω1 (Z,1)
=
w − F2 (Z,1)
e Ω2 (Z,1)
.








After the introduction of a small number of skilled individuals at B,s i n c eβ<1, we know that
F2 (Z,1) + λBe Ω2 (Z,1) = w. (52)
But since by inspection of Figure 9 it is immediate that λB >λ A it follows from (51) and (52)
that







This implies that Z< SA
1−SA. It then follows immediately from (49) and (50) that ws (B) >w s (A).
There is a strict incentive for skilled workers to migrate from the rich to the poor country when
diﬀerences are driven by hysteresis. ¥
46